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Abstract. A new variant of the DDoS attack, called Economic Denial
of Sustainability (EDoS) attack has emerged. Since the cloud service is
based on the pay-per-use model, the EDoS attack endeavors to scale up
the resource usage over time to the point the purveyor of the server is
financially incapable of sustaining the service due to the incurred unaf-
fordable usage charges. The implication of the EDoS attack is a major
security implication as more elastic cloud services are being deployed.
Existing techniques to detect and mitigate such attacks are either have
low accuracy or ineffective and, in some cases, aggravate the attack even
further. Therefore, an enhanced EDoS Mitigation Mechanism (EMM), is
proposed to address these shortcomings using OpenFlow and statistical
techniques, i.e. Hellinger Distance and Entropy. The experiments clearly
depicted that EMM is able to detect and mitigate EDoS attacks with
high accuracy and it is effective in terms of resource utilization compared
to existing mitigation techniques. Thus, it can be deployed in the cloud
environment without the need for additional resource requirements.
Keywords: Anomaly Detection Techniques · Cloud Computing · DDoS
Attack · Mitigation Techniques · Security Threats
1 Introduction
Cloud Computing [25,15], is the next revolution in the Information and Commu-
nication Technology (ICT) arena [1]. It is a model in which computing is delivered
as a commoditized service like electricity, water, and telecommunication. Cloud
computing (CC) provides software, platform, infrastructure, and other hybrid
models, which are delivered as subscription-based services in which customers
pay based on usage [4]. Nevertheless, security is one of the main factors that
inhibit the proliferation of CC [26,17].
Economic Denial of Sustainability (EDoS) is a new breed of security and
economical threats to the CC paradigm [22]. Unlike the traditional Distributed
Denial of Service (DDoS) [10] which brings down a service by exhausting the
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resources of a targeted server in traditional setup, EDoS takes advantage of the
elasticity feature provided as a cloud service [10,24]. This causes the resources
to dynamically scale to meet the demand (because of EDoS attack) resulting in
a hefty bill for the customer. EDoS attack is considered as one of the concerns
that has stalled many organizations from adopting or migrating their operations
and/or data to the cloud [22]. This is because an EDoS attack targets the finan-
cial component of the service provider and customers; which has high visibility
on the impact of such attacks.
In this research, the detection and mitigation accuracy of EMM is assessed
and compared against the state-of-the-art techniques such as EDoS Shield and
with other techniques in terms of various quality facets. Moreover, the mitiga-
tion performance of the EMM is also assessed against HTTP and UDP attacks.
In both cases, the results demonstrate that the EMM improves the mitigation
capabilities of cloud systems. In all scenarios, EMM can detect HTTP and UDP
attack resulting in improved mitigation accuracy. The assessment result demon-
strated that EMM achieved its objectives.
Rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes some of the
existing state-of-the-art EDoS mitigation techniques, their features and limita-
tions. The proposed EMM technique is presented in Section 3. The experimental
setup is depicted in Section 4. Performance evaluation of the proposed scheme
and its comparative analysis with existing EDoS techniques are presented in
Section 5. And finally, the conclusion and future works are outlined in Section
6.
2 Existing EDoS Mitigation Techniques
Most of the current literature available addresses mainly on DDoS protection
emphasizing on techniques for preventing of apparently malicious traffic at the
network or application layer [24,6,12,5]. There is limited number of literatures
that are available to provide deployable solutions specifically for mitigating EDoS
attacks in Cloud Computing environment. Most of the researchers in the field
of CC and network monitoring are relying on the predefined threshold and on
entropy techniques to detect anomalies in network traffic. Some of the well-known
EDoS mitigation techniques are as follows:
In 2009 self-verifying proof of work (sPoW) was proposed by Khor and Nakao
[13]. The authors attempted to distinguish the EDoS attack, On-demand net-
work filter and prioritize the legitimate traffic from network level DDoS traffic. In
order to do so, sPoW does two things: First, it does packet pattern matching to
distinguish and filter the DDoS network traffic. Second, it allows the legitimate
traffic to go through the network. This mechanism does packet filtering based
on cryptography puzzles methodology. By applying such algorithm, it allows
legitimate traffic while discards the malicious network level DDoS traffic. How-
ever, it possesses certain drawbacks. Firstly, asymmetric computational power
consumption for the clients. Solving computational puzzles require more CPU
power and suitable only to faster CPUs. Therefore, mobile devices with less
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processing power will not be able to re-solve the puzzles, thus unable to access
the cloud resources [9]. Secondly, the Server must create separate channels to
address each request. In case of large number of incoming requests, server will
generate number of puzzles which leads to puzzle accumulation attack if puzzles
do not resolve in time.
Later in 2011, Sqalli et al. proposed another mitigation technique called
EDoS-Shield [23]. This technique distinguishes the legitimate and malicious re-
quests by checking the users presence at client-side machine. EDoS-Shield archi-
tecture consists of Virtual Firewall (VF) and Verifier Nodes that functions in
tandem to execute the EDoS mitigation tasks. The incoming requests are filtered
by firewall based on white and black-lists. When client makes access request, the
verifier node verifies it through a Turing test. In case client passes that test, its
IP address will be maintained in white-list and the subsequent requests received
from the same client are forwarded directly to the cloud scheduler, approving
resource allocations. Whereas, if a client fails that Turing test, its IP address will
be included in the black-list and the subsequent requests from the same client
will be dropped down by the firewall itself. Nevertheless, the proposed technique
has certain constraints. First, it is vulnerable to spoofing attack. By performing
IP address spoofing, attacker can use IP address belonging to the white-list of
the verifier node to carry out an EDoS attack that would remain undetected.
Second, due to its designed mechanism it can possess higher false positive rate
by blocking of many IP addresses belonging to the legitimate users, as the two
lists are not updated in a timely and accurate manner.
In-cloud scrubber service is another mechanism proposed to mitigate the
EDoS attack [14]. This mechanism uses on-demand web service (Scrubber Ser-
vice) to address such attack by using crypto puzzle approach to validate the
legitimate users request [13]. This mechanism offers two modes namely; nor-
mal mode and suspected mode. Based on the requirement service providers can
choose the one accordingly. For instance, during normal scenario when the web
server is perceived normally it runs in normal mode. Whenever service provider
observes the web server resource exhaustion beyond an acceptable limit and
high bandwidth utilization, this could be considered as attempt of EDoS attack.
Thus, service provider enables its suspected mode and an On-demand call is di-
rected to the Scrubber service to generate and verifies hard puzzle. But there are
certain limitations with this mechanism as follows: it can only detect and miti-
gate HTTP attacks, also it depends on third party application for authentication
purpose.
In 2013, Mudassar proposed an EDoS mitigation framework known as EDoS
Armor [16] specifically meant for E-Commerce applications. It uses two-step
approach, comprises of admission control and congestion control. At first, when
user initiates a session, the server sends a challenge to the user, it could be
an image or a cryptographic puzzle to be resolved, in case user resolves the
challenge, the request is being directed to admission control. Otherwise, the
session of the user gets dropped and the number of connections to the server
are limited for the user. This technique applies port hiding approach to restrict
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the users, as attack cannot be initiated in the absence of a valid port number.
Next, the behavior of the user browsing is consistently being traced. whenever an
abnormal behaviour is detected, service priority is being set for that particular
user based on his previous records. Thus, in this manner, EDoS Armor can
mitigate EDoS application. However, in E-commerce applications new users may
find it complicated system due to its complexity in design. Therefore, in practice,
the implementation of this method seems to be doubtful.
Recently, Chowdhury et al. proposed a new approach known as EDoS Eye
to counter the EDoS attack [7]. This model applies game theory approach to
mitigate the EDoS traffic. Authors claim to develop a Game Based Decision
Module (GBDM) that can get threshold values to restrict the incoming traffic.
Similarly, another technique proposed by Shawahna et al. is known as EDoS At-
tack Defense Shell (EDoS-ADS) [21]. According to the authors, this technique is
applicable to Network Address Translation (NAT) based networks where it gets
triggered if it sniffs any incoming abnormal traffic. For instance, in an attack
scenario, it triggers a checking component to differentiate between legitimate
users and attackers. However, both techniques were evaluated in simulation en-
vironments that have their own limitations as well as not closely representing
the real-world scenario.
In the context of this work, a summary of previous efforts and research has
been done in the area of network worm, network scanning and signature automa-
tion approaches. The main observations that can be derived from the literature
review are:
– It is inevitable that CC is replacing traditional computing, and this has con-
sequently brought along security challenges unique to cloud infrastructures.
– EDoS, a variant of DDoS attack, specific to subscription-based CC services,
is on the rise. Such an attack affects the financial aspect of hosting a service
on a CC environment.
– Most of the existing techniques to addressing the issue of EDoS attacks are
mainly Application-based solutions.
– An appropriate testbed that can enable real-time and hi-speed analysis of a
net-work is lacking.
– A more robust approach is required to ensure EDoS can be mitigated effec-
tively.
3 Our Proposed Technique
In this section, we describe our proposed mitigation mechanism for Cloud Compu-
ting (CC) environments known as EDoS Mitigation Mechanism (EMM) [3]. The
aim of this mechanism is to be effective enough to mitigate different type of
EDoS attacks while consume less resources. It consists of three major modules
namely Data preparation, Detection, and Mitigation, which work in conjunction
to achieve this objective. Fig.1, depicts the architecture of the proposed EMM
technique.
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Fig. 1. Proposed EMM technique.
In first phase, the network traffic is sampled using sFlow agents and sent
for analysis to sFlow collector. Network statistics are generated using the inputs
received by the sFlow collector and traffic is then segregated based on source IP,
source port, destination IP, destination port, and counter. In the second phase,
network statistics are compared against the threshold value defined using HD
and classified for suspicious behaviours based on an entropy analysis. In the final
phase, Open Flow (OF) controllers drop the network traffic of suspicious source
IP addresses by updating switching rules and continue monitoring the network
for anomalies. The functionality of these EMM components are described as:
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3.1 Data preparation
In this module, data is being collected during the flow-based monitoring [19,11].
sFlow agent is used to collect the flow of network traffic and passed to sFlow
collector for information extraction. EMM leverages sFlow packet sampling tech-
nique to monitor traffic in real-time, Packet sampling decouple the flow collec-
tion process form the forwarding plane and provides all flow related statistical
information. This method provided efficient and aggregated packet forwarding,
eliminating the specific flow entries requirement of native OF approach and
overcome flow-table size limitations by reducing the number of flow entries in
OF switches. EMM uses a simplified flow collection algorithm to minimize the
system resource requirements and provides adequate information for a reliable
attack detection process.
Based on the protocol type such as TCP, UDP or ICMP, the collected data is
processed and segregated before being summarized and later passed to detection
module. The 6 tuple information like switch ID, source IP, destination IP, source
port, destination port and counter from the datagram are being extracted. This
information is later utilized by detection module to set a dynamic threshold using
Hellinger distance and entropy based flood detection for alerting and mitigation
of attack.
3.2 Detection module
The collected datagram packets are being analyzed to extract the information
such as source and destination IP, port number, and number of packets per sec-
ond. By using Hellingers distribution [18] and entropy methods [20], this module
defines the dynamic threshold settings as well as performs anomaly detection
tasks respectively.
Threshold Detection: Hellingers distribution (HD) is used to measure the
distance between two probability distribution. To compute HD, assume two dis-
tributions on same sample space are present, namely: P:(p1, p2, ..., pn) and
Q:(q1, q2, ..., qn). HD between two distributions can then be defined as:
H2(P,Q) =
1
2
∑
n
i = 1(
√
Pi−
√
Qi)2 (1)
HD value will vary between 0 and 1, where 0 represent identical distribution
and 1 represents different probability distribution. Low probability among two
distribution implies no significant deviation and abrupt elevated HD simply in-
dicates the anomaly or attack in the network. To indicate the anomaly in the
network, a detection threshold is required. To obtain a dynamic threshold that
allows the proposed mechanism to be used in any kind of network environment,
EMM relies on HD probability distribution method [3].
We adopted entropy method [20] in our proposed EMM technique as the
anomaly detection algorithm. The opted method not only effectively classifies
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attack patterns, but also distinguishes the attackers and the victims. Once net-
work anomaly is detected, this method examines and correlates definite network
metrics identifying the attack and revealing all related information to the attack
mitigation module.
3.3 Mitigation module
This is the last module; it is accountable for alert generation and mitigation of
attacks in the network. By updating the rules on the network devices, it takes
appropriate action. Decision engine analyses the incoming traffic (received from
mitigation module) against a set of rules. Based on that analyses decision such as
whether to block the network traffic originating from an IP address for specific
period or not can be made.
The processed information from detection module is passed to decision engine
where a dynamic threshold is applied to detect the EDoS attack and entropy
analysis is applied to verify the existence of attack. Both feedbacks from detec-
tion module is correlated with the network traffic statistics from the OpenFlow
network Switch. Based on the correlation, the decision engine (DE) in tandem
with the mitigation engine make decision to either drop the packet on network
perimeter or report the anomaly to the network/client administrator.
Alerting engine allows EMM to generate alert and update the clients cloud
administrators via periodic email updates. In case of an anomaly detected in
the network, this engine sends network updates using its periodic update cycle
as configured by client. Whereas, in case of an attack, it immediately sends a
message or an E-mail alert to the client as well as CSPs Security Operation
Centre (SOC) for notifying the ongoing attack.
4 Experimental Setup
Before going to the results of the evaluation, it is imperative to understand the
design of the experiments upfront. They are detailed as follows:
4.1 Cloud Testbed Setup Environment
The performance of any of such mechanism is best evaluated on an existing
cloud computing environment. However, access to such an environment is often
not possible due to the usage of propriety tools or service provider organizations
policies. Although there are solutions using simulation tools such as Mininet [8],
only limited evaluation can be performed. For this purpose, a standard bench-
mark for cloud computing environment is developed as a testbed using Open-
Stack cloud computing environment with OpenDay Light (ODL) as Open Flow
Controller (OFC) [19]. This allows the possibility to create network topologies
and to carry out various tests.
An OpenFlow controller is an application, which controls the network flow
in SDN. Generally, SDN uses OpenFlow protocol to manage the network. OF
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acts as an operating system for virtual networking. Communication between
devices and applications must pass through the controller and controller will
update flow-tables on switches to send data packets to application. The controller
that manages network devices (Specification-Version 2013) and decides on the
best route to route traffic to application uses the OpenFlow protocol. Instead
of hardware firmware, network control plane is used so that network can be
managed more dynamically and with increased precisions.
OpenDaylight (ODL) controller is the most recent addition to OpenFlow
controllers and is written in Java. It is meant to be a common platform for all
SDN users. Recently, ODL pronounced its second release, Helium. ODL sup-
port most of the operating systems, i.e., Linux, Mac and Windows, and it has
the feature of topology discovery. ODL uses karaf framework, which makes it
modular, besides enabling plug-in of various application modules developed in
Java. The developed testbed enables the opportunity for one to utilize a modern
platform to design the topology with any number of virtual machines, Open-
Flow controllers, virtual routers, and firewalls. With the implemented testbed,
virtual machines can be launched with various web applications (web server).
The testbed also consists of target machine, which primarily experience the large
volume of attach/user traffic.
At first instance, all new traffic will pass through OFC, which will update
all the network switches to perform basic forwarding functions. However, all
switches and components are configured with sFlow agents to periodically update
the monitoring agent with the current network statistics. Once traffic exceeds a
defined threshold, the decision engine will update the OFC about the network
condition and in return, OFC updates the flow table of switches to instruct the
devices to drop the traffic from a specific attacker host. The rest of the traffic
from other nodes will not be affected by the new flow update. The design of
this testbed allows efficient monitoring process without introducing latencies or
overhead to the underlying cloud computing network.
The specification of the utilized hardware (servers) is provided as below and
in Table 1, Blade Chassis M100OC with Power Edge M 610 Server:
– M610, Dual Quad Core Processor / 16 GB / 1 TB HDD.
– 720xd, Dual Hex Core Processor/ 64GB/ 4 TB HDD.
5 Performance Evaluation
All conducted experiments were carried out for a duration of 5 minutes. The
duration of 5 minutes was used because the auto scaling timers used for the
upper threshold is assumed to be duration of 5 minutes [2]. Specifically, the
evaluation was performed to answer the following research question:
a) What is the influence of network traffic from different communication
protocols, i.e., HTTP, (TCP) and UDP in the effectiveness of EMM in a cloud
computing environment?
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Table 1. Hardware Specifications
No. of Machines Operating Systems Hardware Details Purpose
1 Ubuntu14.04 x64 1TB HDD, 16GB RAM Controller
1 Ubuntu14.04 x64 1TB HDD, 16GB RAM Network
1 Ubuntu14.04 x64 1TB HDD, 16GB RAM OpenFlow Controller
1 Ubuntu14.04 x64 1TB HDD, 16GB RAM Compute-1
1 Ubuntu14.04 x64 1TB HDD, 16GB RAM Compute-1
1 Ubuntu14.04 x64 1TB HDD, 16GB RAM Compute-1
1 VMware ESXi6 4TB HDD, 64GB RAM Various VM
b) How well does EMM perform in comparison with other state-of-the-art
approach?
The network topology for all the evaluation consists of five nodes that gener-
ate (pushes) normal traffic to the target machine and one host will be dedicated
for inducing and generating attack traffic to the target machine. Victims net-
work bandwidth is fixed at 10Mbps so that any variation in network can be
easily measured.
5.1 Evaluation Metrics
The core idea behind the proposal of a mechanism i.e. EMM is to quickly detect
and mitigate an ongoing EDoS attack as soon as possible to reduce the incurred
damage to the cloud service/user. As such, the experiments that were conducted
in evaluating EMM uses the standard metrics which measures the consumed
resources, such as CPU, Memory, and Network bandwidth utilization rates.
The evaluation metrics are to be interpreted as following: the closer the
resource consumption pattern to the baseline (or normal traffic), the better the
performance of the evaluated mechanism. This is also applicable to the costs
incurred by the cloud user; whereby, the lower the costs incurred, the better the
performance of the mechanism in place.
Use Case 1: Influence of TCP (HTTP) Flooding Attack as an EDoS Attack.
The first set of experiments were conducted to investigate the influence of
HTTP traffic flooding attack as an EDoS attack. HTTP flooding attack is the
most common application layer attack (OSI Layer 7). This attack is volumet-
ric in nature and uses legitimate protocols GET or POST requests to retrieve
information from the URL data. In the first
In the first experiment, the victim machine was flooded with HTTP GET
requests using the BoNeSi botnet DDoS HTTP flood simulator. The network and
computers network utilization are constantly being monitored via the monitoring
tools.
At the same time, network traffic of random HTTP GET requests are gen-
erated using scripts that are running on five participating nodes to generate
normal traffic to the webserver. The command line for the script is executed as
shown below:
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root@ubuntu:\$perl httpflooder.pl -a GF h 192.168.200.53 t 400
Use Case 2: Influence of UDP Flooding Attack as an EDoS Attack.
A UDP flooding attack is another most common volumetric attack in the
network. Attackers craft large-sized UDP packets and direct them to the victim.
As the UDP protocol is connectionless, it can be exploited to launch quick and
massive attacks as it does not require any handshakes as it is with TCP sessions.
In fact, UDP attacks on NTP service have been observed to have reached
a peak of 500Gbps [11]. DNS amplification attack is another example of UDP
attack also known as the alphabet soup attack. As there is no specific packet
format defined for UDP, attackers can craft large packets, fill it with junk text
or numbers (alphabet soup), and redirect them to the victim of their choice. The
victims usually have to receive the packets and analyze them manually one by
one before discarding useless packets.
Such a UDP attack has been used to evaluate the effectiveness of EMM to
mitigate such attacks. For that, IPerf is used to generate UDP streams of 20Mb
of random size packets to the victim IP as the attack traffic. The attack is
repeated with an interval of 400 sec using command as:
root@ubuntu:$ iperf -c 192.168.200.53 v b 20M t 400
In addition to the attack traffic, normal UDP traffic is also generated using
10Mb as bandwidth for a 300 sec interval using IPerf command line as shown
below:
root@ubuntu:$ iperf c 192.168.200.53 u b 10M t 300
5.2 Comparative Analysis
To understand the influence of the different types of protocols on the performance
of EMM, an experiment on comparing the effectiveness of EMM against the
state-of-the-art technique was conducted. The EDoS Shield framework has been
chosen and implemented in the testbed to be compared with EMM because of its
efficiency in HTTP GET flooding attack mitigation as mentioned in Section 2.
The proposed EMM and EDoS shield are compared using the evaluation setup
that was used for EDoS shield [23]:
– Normal network traffic rate 48Kpps.
– Attack traffic rate of 184Kpps.
– EMM is configured to block attacker host for an hour (similar to EDoS
shield).
This comparative study conducted in two scenarios: (a) attack originated
from random hosts, and (b) attack originated from a white-listed hosts. The
results of the comparative evaluation are presented as follows:
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Attack Originated from a Random Host (non-whitelist): In this exper-
iment, normal traffic rate of 48Kpps is generated from one of the hosts using
the httpflooder.pl script and the attack traffic of 184Kpps is generated from five
host using BoNeSi tool for a duration of one hour. In EDoS-Shield, as a legiti-
mate host try to access the services on cloud, it gets verified by the firewall and
verifier node using the GTT test. Once verified, IP of the host gets added to the
whitelist of the firewall and gets subsequent access to the cloud resources. When
an (automated) attacker host access the service, it would fail to respond to GTT
test and gets added to the blacklist of the firewall which allows only legitimate
user to access the cloud resources.
Meanwhile, in EMM, legitimate hosts trying to access the service on cloud
will be serviced by the cloud resources. However, when an attacker requests
access to the resources, it too is allowed as long the requests are within the
allowed dynamic threshold. Any attempt of abusing the resource consumption
would lead the attackers IP to be blocked for a pre-defined duration, i.e., an
hour.
The analysis of the data collected from the comparative experiments are
presented in Fig. 2, 3, and 4. In general, the performance of both EMM and
EDoS Shield is roughly the same across the different measurements. Fig. 2 de-
picts the network utilization pattern (in terms of Kpps) in dependence of time.
EMM and EDoS-shield performs similar across the experiments with very minor
fluctuations that are negligible.
Fig. 2. Network utilization comparison between EMM and EDoS-Sheild in new attack
scenario.
Fig. 3 shows the CPU utilization rate between both compared mechanisms.
Both mechanisms utilized pretty much the same amount of CPU utilization to
perform in mitigating the EDoS attack.
Fig. 4 illustrates the memory utilization comparison between the two miti-
gation mechanisms. Throughout the evaluation, the memory utilization between
the two mechanisms remained the same.
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Fig. 3. CPU utilization comparison between EMM and EDoS-Sheild in new attack
scenario.
Fig. 4. Memory utilization comparison between EMM and EDoS-Sheild in new attack
scenario.
Attack Originated from a White-listed Host: In this scenario, normal
traffic of 48Kpps is generated from one host using the httpflooder.pl script and
the attack traffic of 184Kpps is generated from five hosts using BoNeSi for the
duration of one hour.
In EDoS-Shield, as the attacker host and legitimate host are already in the
white-list, hosts trying to access the services on cloud will be granted directly.
Hence, this would be a scenario whereby the network/victim do not have any
mitigation mechanism in place. Whereas in EMM, as legitimate hosts try to
access the service on cloud, they will get serviced with the requested cloud re-
sources. This also means that the attackers would be allocated relevant resources
as long as the dynamic threshold level is not breached. If the dynamic thresh-
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old is exceeded, all network traffic with the attackers source IP address will be
blocked for an hour.
Fig. 5 depicts the measurement of the network utilization during the attack
with each mechanism in place. When EDoS shield is in place, the attack traffic
surges up to 800Mb of network utilization. Meanwhile, for EMM, the utilization
rate remains below 100Mb throughout the experiment. Another observation that
can be inferred from the results of the analysis is: EMM is able to protect the
cloud users by conserving up to 700Mb of the network bandwidth utilization.
Fig. 5. Network utilization comparison between EMM and EDoS-Sheild in white-listed
attack scenario.
Fig. 6 shows the measurement of the CPU utilization during the attack with
each mechanism in place. When EDoS shield is in place, the attack traffic surges
up to 80% of utilization rate. Meanwhile, for EMM, the utilization rate remains
below 30% throughout the experiment. Another observation that can be inferred
from the results of the analysis is: EMM is able to protect the cloud users by
conserving up to 45% of the CPU utilization rate.
Fig. 6. CPU utilization comparison between EMM and EDoS-Sheild in white-listed
attack scenario.
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Fig. 7 represents the memory utilization of the victim machine under attack
condition with the two mitigation mechanisms in place. Since EDoS-shield is not
able to filter the traffic origination from white-listed IP addresses, the memory
consumption has increased slightly more than 50% from that of the consumption
for EMM. In the case of cloud computing services, when the initially allocated
resources are depleted or almost exhausted, additional VMs are allocated. How-
ever, these translates as additional costs for the providers of the service, i.e.,
cloud users. This is further exploited to cause EDoS attack on them by the
attacker.
Fig. 7. Memory utilization comparison between EMM and EDoS-Sheild in white-listed
attack scenario.
To summarize the experiment in comparing the performance and features of
EMM and EDoS Shield:
– EDoS Shield utilizes a firewall, black-list, and white-list modules. If an IP
from white-list initiate an attack, this framework does not provide any kind
of protection. Hence, this is a major drawback of this mechanism. Meanwhile,
EMM uses network traffic only. When the dynamic threshold is exceeded, all
packets from the attackers source IP will be blocked for a pre-defined interval.
Hence, this mechanism is not susceptible to any direct attacks externally.
– Firewall nodes in EDoS Shield are susceptible to DDoS attack as it needs to
handle all traffic of new IP addresses to verify the legitimacy of an incoming
packet. In the case of a spoofed network traffic, this mechanism would suffer
greatly from needing to verify each newly observed IP address. Meanwhile,
EMM does not need to expose itself to the outside world, i.e., it works in
a passive manner. EMM only need to interact to OFCs to update the flow
tables after the detection of an ongoing attack.
– EDoS Shield only provides protection for HTTP-based attacks whereas EMM
provide protection to any type of general protocols attacks including HTTP,
UDP and ICMP flooding attacks.
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Moreover, EMM was also compared with some other existing EDoS mecha-
nisms such as sPoW, and In-Cloud Scrubber based on their designed method-
ologies, resistance against EDoS (traffic types) and features that describes their
functionalities. Both mechanisms were designed to mitigate the HTTP attacks.
It orders to do so, sPoW performs packet filtering which is based on cryptogra-
phy puzzles methodology whereas In-Cloud Scrubber does puzzle generation and
verification process. However, these methods have certain limitations: 1) they re-
quire authentication from third party applications, 2) due to their design, delay
is encountered while setting up the connection, 3) Likewise EDoS-Shield, these
mechanisms can only mitigate HTTP based attacks. In contrast to that, EMM
mechanism does not require an authentication process nor it relies on any kind
of support from third party applications. Moreover, it is effective in terms of
resource usage i.e. network, CPU, and memory.
In summary, Table 2 provides the comparison between the various state-
of-the-art EDoS mitigation techniques, namely: EDoS Shield, sPoW, In-cloud
Scrubber, and EMM.
Table 2. Comparison of various EDoS mitigation techniques.
Techniques Methodology Mitigation Against
3rd Party
Auth.
Requirement
Delay in
Setting Up
Connection
Additional Overhead
EDoS-Sheild
Virtual firewall and
Authentication
HTTP attacks Yes Yes Yes
sPoW
Packet filtering
based on
cryptography puzzles
HTTP attacks Yes Yes Yes
In Cloud-Scrubber
Puzzle generation
and verification
HTTP attacks Yes Yes Yes
EMM Packet inspection
HTTP, UDP,
ICMP attacks
No No No
6 Conclusion and Future Work
In this study, the proposed technique is compared with existing EDoS detection
and mitigation techniques by using various evaluation metrics, resistant to dif-
ferent type of EDoS attacks, and features that define their functionalities. The
comparative results confirm that EMM can detect and mitigate EDoS attacks
with higher accuracy rate than existing techniques. Unlike other state-of-the-art
techniques, EMM detects an ongoing EDoS attack by conducting network mon-
itoring. Due to its design, EMM requires very minimal overhead in deploying it
in a cloud environment.
The evaluation was not only done with in comparison with state-of-the-art
techniques, but most significantly, it was conducted in a real-world testbed en-
vironment that closely resembles a commercial cloud computing environment
setup. EMM also fulfils its objectives of this study in coming up with an effec-
tive EDoS detection and mitigation mechanism.
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Our area for future work would be to investigate and assert the feasibility of
extending EMM to detect and mitigate EDoS/DDoS attacks as a SaaS model
in cloud. Such a service could not only allow the users to ensure their bills
are not inflated due to ongoing EDoS attacks, but also allow the cloud service
providers to convince their new and existing customers that their cloud service
incorporates EMM to provide a unique service that brings back the confidence
to the users.
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